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Telecommunication and the Japanese Empire: 
A Preliminary Analysis of Telegraphic Traffic 
Daqing Yang ∗ 
Abstract: »Telekommunikation und das japanische Kaiserreich: Eine vorläu-
fige Analyse des telegraphischen Verkehrs«. The study of information flow has 
been under-developed in telecommunications history in part due to the paucity 
of traffic data. Interestingly Imperial Japan has left a remarkably large collec-
tion of telecommunication traffic data, perhaps unmatched by other imperial 
powers. Given the enormous importance Japan placed on its telecommunica-
tions network at home and in East Asia, it is only appropriate to ask how it was 
used and what kind of information went through it. As a preliminary analysis 
of the traffic data in the Japanese empire over its fifty-year history, my paper 
examines the content, volume, and direction of information flows as well as the 
underlying economic, political, and technological factors. Such an analysis can 
enrich our understanding of how a modern empire operates in terms of its con-
trol of information flows. It can provide empirical flesh to the structural theory 
of imperialism, as proposed by Johan Galtung and others. 
Keywords: Japanese Empire, telegraphic traffic, press telegrams, money order 
telegrams, photo-telegrams. 
 
Telecommunications is now commonly accepted as an essential “tool of em-
pire” for the colonial powers. Telegraph cables, as historian Daniel Headrick 
pointed out nearly thirty years ago, formed “an essential part of the new impe-
rialism.”1 Headrick considers telecommunications to be among the several key 
technological developments most crucial to European imperialism, “either by 
making imperialism possible where it was otherwise unlikely, or by making it 
suitably cost-effective in the eyes of budget-minded governments.” Telecom-
munications, argues Headrick, gave value to a handful of mostly deserted is-
lands in the most isolated parts of the world, and in a few instances helped 
empires to expand. More important was the fact that cable and wireless com-
munications served to tie the European empires together. In times of peace, 
they were the lifelines of the ever-increasing business communications that 
bound imperialist nations to their colonies around the world. In times of crisis, 
they were valuable tools of diplomacy. And in times of war, communications 
were security itself. Headrick distinguishes several stages of European imperi-
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1  Daniel Headrick, Tools of Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 160-164. 
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alism that begin with penetration and are followed by conquest. In the final 
phase of consolidation, he notes, “the links that tied the colonies to Europe and 
promoted their economic exploitation included steamship lines, the Suez Canal, 
the submarine telegraph cables, and the colonial railroads.”2 As Headrick 
phrases it, the “web of power that tied the colonial empires together was made 
of electricity as well as steam and iron.”3 
Given the enormous importance attributed to the telecommunications net-
works, it is only appropriate to ask how they were used and what kind of in-
formation went through them. For instance, can telecommunication traffic 
between the home country and the overseas possessions help us better under-
stand the nature and process of imperial expansion? Can the information flow 
reveal anything new about the dynamics and structure of empire? Surprisingly, 
such questions are largely absent in most works on telecommunications and 
European imperialism that have appeared in recent decades. Much more com-
mon is the descriptive approach using narrative evidence quoted in the opening 
paragraph.  
In contrast, telecommunication traffic – volumes of telegrams sent and re-
ceived, number of words sent, frequency and length of phone calls – can be 
measured in precise units, as can letters, postcards, and parcels. Such traffic 
data can be useful for a variety of practical reasons – for, among other things, 
calculating tariffs, assessing the capacity of cable and wireless circuits, and 
forecasting future growth. For historians of telecommunications, however, such 
data can be useful but not always available. Partly due to its strong government 
monopoly and control over telecommunications, Imperial Japan (1868-1945) 
has left a remarkably large collection of telecommunication traffic data.4 The 
government-run telegraph offices, under either the Ministry of Communica-
tions or Communications Bureaus in the colonies, compiled basic traffic data 
on a monthly basis. After Japan occupied Manchuria, it set up a public-private 
joint venture known as the Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Company 
(MTT) to operate telecommunications in the region as a monopoly. This model 
was later adopted in occupied areas in China during the Sino-Japanese War 
when Japan set up the North China Telegraph (NCTT) and Telephone Com-
                                                             
2  Headrick, Tools of Empire, 11-12. 
3  Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-
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4  For a discussion of the purpose and process of data collecting, see Denshin denwa jigyô shi 
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human errors, it is impossible to produce one set of reliable telecommunication data cover-
ing the entire 1870-1945 period. Data-gathering became much more sporadic after 1942. 
For a relatively complete set and explanations of various discrepancies, see DDJS 7: 440-
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pany and Central China Telecommunications Company (CCTC). These Japa-
nese-controlled telecommunications companies in wartime occupied China also 
compiled traffic data. 
An explanation about data and methodology is in order here. To begin with, 
the measurable units of communication traffic – the amount of information in a 
technical sense – should not be confused with the value of the information, 
since that depends on the content, which is beyond quantitative measurement.5 
Moreover, electronic communications was by no means the only mechanism of 
information transmission in Japan and its empire. Throughout Imperial Japan, 
the postal service was still the most widely used means of public communica-
tion. If we broaden our definition of information flow to include one-way 
communication, mass media such as printed publications and radio broadcast-
ing clearly had an enormous, albeit a different, impact on society as well. As a 
preliminary analysis of the traffic data in the Japanese empire, this chapter 
examines the content, volume, and direction of information flows as well as the 
underlying economic, political, and technological factors.6 
Before such an analysis is attempted, a brief history of telecommunications 
history in modern Japan is necessary. Both the telegraph and telephone were 
introduced to Japan in the later half of the nineteenth century. Despite its hum-
ble start, Japan’s domestic telegraph network expanded at an impressive pace 
in the early 1870s. The 1,340-kilometer Tokyo-Nagasaki trunk line was com-
pleted in 1873, followed two years later by the completion of the 825-kilometer 
Tokyo-Aomori trunk line. Telegraph construction also went on in Hokkaido 
and Kyushu simultaneously. It took only six years for the Meiji government to 
link all major Japanese cities, from Sapporo in the north to Kumamoto in the 
south, in a nationwide telegraphic communication network. In 1875 Japan’s 
total telegraph lines had reached 1,760 li (6,912 kilometers or 4,294 miles), 
carrying 612,000 telegrams a year. As Fukuzawa Yūkichi – Meiji Japan’s most 
influential intellectual on modernization – observed with apparent excitement 
at the opening of the Tokyo Central Telegraph Office in 1878, 
[w]hen we think about the function of the telegraph, we can either say that the 
distance of 1,700 li has been reduced to naught, or that the body of the Japa-
nese has been extended to all locales. Since there are also telegraph lines in fo-
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6  For an excellent discussion of the approaches and problems in studying the flow of infor-
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(London: Sage Publications, 1997), chap. 2. A pioneer in studying the flow of information, 
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ence, New Series 221, no. 4611 (1983): 609-613. It is noteworthy that Sola Pool’s study 
was partly influenced by the postwar Japanese efforts to conduct communication flow cen-
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reign countries, not only Japan but the entire world will be shrunk and made 
more manageable.”7 
After some internal debates, the Japanese government established monopoly 
over the postal and telecommunications service. Beginning in 1885, the Minis-
try of Communication (hereafter MOC) was put in charge of a broad range of 
public utilities such as postal, telecommunications, as well as shipping. The 
only exception was international cable telegraphy, secured by the Danish com-
pany the Great Northern Telegraph Company in a series of agreements with the 
Japanese government.  
As Japan consolidated state-building and embarked on industrialization at 
home, it extended its influence and control beyond its shores. Beginning from 
1895, when Japan’s victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War secured its 
first overseas colonies, Japan emerged as a full-fledged colonial empire by the 
time of World War I. After defeating its rival Russia in the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-05, Japan acquired South Sakhalin (renamed Karafuto) and se-
cured areas of influence in the Chinese northeast (known as Manchuria). In 
1910, Japan annexed Korea, after making the latter a protectorate. Japan’s 
participation in the Great War as an ally of Britain was rewarded with trustee-
ship of the former German possessions in the South Pacific.8  
After a decade of peace, Japan resumed territorial expansion with the 1931 
occupation of Manchuria, where the puppet state of Manchukuo was estab-
lished in 1932. By summer of 1937, tension with China escalated and led to the 
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Four years later, in December 
1941, Japan declared war against the United States, Britain, and the Nether-
lands. By mid-1942, Japan was in control of a vast territory that was nine times 
of the Japanese Empire in 1930. As with other colonial powers, telecommuni-
cations played a crucial role in Japan’s overseas expansion into colonies as well 
as its wartime empire in the entire East Asia.9  
The Structure of Empire 
Available telecommunication traffic data shows a steady increase in communi-
cation within Japan’s sphere of influence at the beginning of the 1930s after a 
decline in the years of the Great Depression. In contrast, international traffic 
                                                             
7  Wakai Noboru and Takahashi Yūzō. Terekomu no yōake (Tokyo: Denki tsūshin shinkōkai, 
1994), 76-78, 97. 
8 For a more detailed discussion, see my “Submarine Cables and the Two Japanese Empires,” 
in Communications Under the Seas, ed. by Bernard Finn and Daqing Yang (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2009), 225-252. 
9 For a fuller examination, see my forthcoming book, Technology of Empire: Telecommunica-
tions and Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1883-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Asia Center, 2010). 
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remained largely flat and then declined significantly after the outbreak of the 
Pacific War. This has as much to do with the demand as with the re-designation 
of some international communication traffic as East Asian communication 
(within Japan’s imperium). In 1940, Japan exchanged some 12 million tele-
grams with its colonies, Manchukuo and occupied China, more than ten times 
Japan’s total telegraphic traffic with the rest of the world (see Figure 1).10 
Figure 1: Telegraph Traffic with Colonies, Imperium and the Rest of the 
World, 1929-42. 
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Source: Denmu nenkan 1942, 297-99; Denmu nenkan 1943, 336-37; DDJS Bekkan 594; 
Denshin denwa nenkan [1951], 630. 
 
To better understand structural dynamics within the imperium, one must go 
beyond the aggregate traffic data. In 1933, after years of severe financial con-
straints on domestic telecommunications infrastructure, the Japanese Govern-
ment passed the Communication Special Account, which promised to ensure 
some financial independence of the government-run communications including 
telecommunications. Three months later, an energized Ministry of Communica-
tion conducted the most comprehensive survey of telegraphic use in Japan. A 
nationwide survey of all paid telegrams at nearly all 7,000 telegraph offices 
throughout Japan proper was conducted over an eleven-day period between 
July 10 and 21.11 It measured all government, civilian, and press traffic that 
went through Japanese domestic telecommunications system with the exception 
of those related to its operations, which were free. 
                                                             
10  Denmu nenkan 1942, 297-99; Denmu nenkan 1943, 336-37. The accounting year covers 
twelve months from March of each year. 
11 Teishinshō, Denmukyoku, Denpō kōryū jōkyō ni kansuru chōsa (Tokyo, 1935). 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Colonial Telegraphic Traffic, 1933.  
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Source: Teishinshō, Denmukyoku, Denpō kōryū jōkyō ni kansuru chōsa [Tokyo: 1935]. 
 
The 1933 survey showed that within Japan’s imperium colonial Korea was 
the largest recipient and originator of telegraphic traffic with Japan until the 
mid-1930s. Such a distribution was not static, however. Changes in and direc-
tions of Japan’s imperial telecommunication traffic often reveal dynamics that 
are not always obvious otherwise. 
Figure 3: Telegraph Traffic within the Imperium, 1929-42. 
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Source: Denmu nenkan 1943, 338-39. 
 
After the establishment of Manchukuo, telegraphic traffic between Japan 
and Manchuria/Manchukuo shot up exponentially due to a combination of 
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factors: infrastructure improvement, launching of industrialization and settle-
ment programs (see Figure 3).12  
Like the movement of goods, money, and people, the flow of information is 
never an isolated phenomenon. Changes in traffic volume generally can be 
attributed to a combination of many factors: cost, access, and capacity, as well 
as user demand. To begin with, the access to modern communications services 
was unevenly distributed within Japan’s imperium. As can be seen in table 1, a 
huge gap existed in the overall communication capacity between Japan proper 
and its major colonies with large native populations such as Taiwan and Korea. 
In contrast, frontier colonies with high concentration of Japanese population, 
either the remote Karafuto (southern Sakhalin) and Nan’yō (South Sea Islands) 
or the strategically important Kwantung Leased Territory, registered high vol-
umes of per capita usage.  
Table 1: Communication Indexes in Japan and Its Colonies (1935). 
 Japan 
Proper 
Taiwan Korea Karafuto Nanyō Kwantung 
Territory 
Area (sq km) 382,265 35,961 220,769 36,090 139 3,748 
Population (1,000) 69,255 5,316 21,891 323 105 1,637 
Telegraph Offices 8,232 213 878 91 9 211 
Area per telegraph 
office (sq km) 
47 169 252 397 16 18 
Population per  
telegraph office 
8,413 24,956 24,933 3,544 11,653 7,758 
Telegram Sent 
(1,000) 
73,860 1,902 7,992 905 254 4,113 
Telegram Sent per 
person 
1.067 0.358 0.365 2.807 2.419 2.513 
Telephone sub-
scription 
870,564 16,800 39,763 5,535 392 21,321 
Source: Chôsen Sôtokufu comp., Chôsen teishin tôkei yôran (1936). 
 
A number of factors influence the use of telecommunications. The cost of 
telecommunication services, especially compared with the alternative postal or 
express mail service, has always had a major influence on usage. Expanded 
access is likely to increase use. The fluctuation of demand, complicated as it is, 
is especially influenced by the level of economic activities (for business com-
                                                             
12 Teishinshō, Denmukyoku, Denpō kōryū jōkyō ni kansuru chōsa. 
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munication in particular), political events (especially for press telegrams), and 
natural disasters (personal telegrams).13 
The telegraph service, more widely established and less costly compared 
with the telephone, played by far the greater communication role, but the tele-
phone was used with increasing frequency inside the imperium. Technological 
progress and the subsequent increase in capacity or reduction in unit cost is 
also a major factor in the volume of telecommunications. For instance, the 
completion of non-loaded telephone cable between Japan and Manchukuo via 
Korea made it possible to meet the increased demand for phone calls in all 
three areas. As in the case within Japan proper, however, the telephone was 
used more often for communication over shorter distances compared with the 
telegraph, because the cost of telephone calls was determined by distance 
whereas that of the telegram was often at a set rate for an entire region. This 
may explain the fact that telephonic traffic between Japan and Korea remained 
the strongest (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4: Telephone Traffic within the Imperium, 1932-42.  
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Traffic on the Japan-Manchukuo route before 1940 was measured in three-minute units; Tai-
wan adopted measurement in minutes in mid-1941. Source: Denmu nenkan 1943, 338-39. 
Users, Usage and the Daily Life of Empire 
The contents of communication often prove to be the most elusive aspects of 
the traffic. It was not that the Japanese authorities were not interested in the 
content. Far from it. In wartime, the government invariably established strict 
censorship over all forms of communications throughout the empire to screen 
                                                             
13  For a long-term analysis of Japan’s telegraphic trends, see DDJS 1: 659-68. For a prewar 
effort to correlate the volume of postal communication with economic performance in Ja-
pan, see Matsubara Kazuyoshi, “Tsūshin tōkei yōran o nozokite,” TKZ 339 (November 
1936): 79-83. 
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out messages – especially those sent by news agencies or by foreign citizens – 
that might compromise Japan’s military secrets or harm Japan’s reputation. For 
the same reason, coded messages sent by the public were often banned in areas 
of active military operation. In peacetime, however, practicality made it impos-
sible to record the content of each of the hundreds of thousands of telegrams 
sent or each of the hundreds of the telephone calls made everyday in the vast, 
complex telecommunications network. Only occasionally, telecommunications 
operators in the empire – be it MOC in Japan or MTT – conducted surveys 
over a limited period of time, ranging from days to weeks, in which they tabu-
lated the profiles of senders or compiled a rough estimate of types of messages 
sent. Making use of the 1933 nation-wide survey and supplementing it with 
local surveys from other parts of the imperium, we may begin to piece together 
the profile of users of Japan’s imperial telecommunications network. 
Although official telegrams (kanpō) – both civilian and military – were most 
important for governing the empire and enjoyed discounted rates as well as 
priority in using telecommunications media, their share in the total traffic was 
relatively small (1.6 percent). The large share (98.6 percent) of non-
government use of Japan’s telecommunications network is noteworthy. This 
was also true with telegraph traffic between the home islands and major colo-
nies (see Figure 5) according to the same survey. 
Figure 5: Composition of Colonial Telegraphic Traffic, 1933  
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Source: Teishinshō, Denmukyoku, Denpō kōryū jōkyō ni kansuru chōsa [Tokyo: 1935]. 
 
Within Japan’s colonies, the share of government telegrams was only mini-
mally higher. A survey in Taiwan found that paid telegrams for government 
affairs occupied only 3 percent in 1934.14 According to surveys conducted by 
MTT in 1938 and 1939, among all paid telegrams sent and received in Man-
                                                             
14  Ishida Minoru, “Taiwan ni okeru denshin gyōmu no gaikyō,” Denshin kyōkai kaishi 320 
(May 25, 1937): 13. 
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chukuo, the share of government telegrams was only slightly higher at 5-6 
percent.15 
In terms of traffic and revenue, therefore, Japan’s telecommunications net-
work before the Pacific War was largely used and sustained by nongovernmen-
tal users. 
Who were the leading groups of telegram users in the Japanese empire then? 
By far the largest share of telegrams in the 1933 Japanese survey fell under the 
category of private telegrams (95.1 percent), while press telegrams and money 
order telegrams (kawase denpō) counted for 0.6 percent and 2.9 percent, re-
spectively. In the colony of Taiwan, as many as 63 percent of all paid telegrams 
were related to business transactions or the stock market, followed by a 24 
percent related to social functions, according to the survey in 1937.16 The re-
sults were similar in Manchukuo. Surveys conducted by MTT in 1938 and 
1939 show that among all paid telegrams sent and received in Manchukuo, 
business-related telegrams (59 percent and 46 percent respectively) constituted 
the largest category, followed by personal use (between 35 to 46 percent).17 
Obviously, both institutional and individual users of telecommunications ser-
vice in the Japanese empire deserve further analysis. 
Institutional Users 
It should not be surprising that business-related telegrams were the largest 
category of paid telegrams. Telecommunications services have played a crucial 
role in expanding the geographical sphere of economic activities since the 
Meiji era. As Japanese business interests, large and small, eagerly joined Ja-
pan’s endeavor to build the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the over-
whelming majority of business branches established in the post-1937 period 
were to be found in China and Southeast Asia. Research by Japanese historian 
Kaneko Fumio shows the geographical distribution of large Japanese compa-
nies: in the case of the five large banks and trading companies, for each branch 
office in Japan proper there were seven branch offices outside Japan, mostly in 
East and Southeast Asia.18 A more inclusive survey conducted by the Overseas 
Entrepreneurs Central Association for Postwar Affairs shortly after the war 
similarly found large numbers of Japanese businesses all over East and South-
east Asia. Of all the 1,814 Japanese businesses operating outside Japan proper 
before the surrender, for instance, 324 were in Korea, 366 in Manchuria, and 
                                                             
15  Kishimoto Hajime, “Wagasha no kokumin no kojinteki seikatsu ni taisuru kōken,” (MTT) 
Gyōmu shiryō 10.3 (March 1943): 269. 
16  Ishida, “Taiwan ni okeru denshin gyōmu no gaikyō,” 13. 
17  Kishimoto, “Wagasha no kokumin no kojinteki seikatsu ni taisuru kōken,” 269. 
18  Kaneko Fumio, “Taigai keizai bōchō no kōzu,” in Nihon no senji keizai, ed. Hara Akira 
(Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1995), 195. 
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457 in Southern Region.19 These Japanese business enterprises made up the 
bulk of institutional users of Japan’s imperial telecommunications network. 
Further research into company archives is needed to yield greater knowledge 
about how the information exchange had affected their operations in the im-
perium.  
The relatively small shares of press telegrams in the surveys can be mislead-
ing. For one thing, press telegrams tended to be much longer than average 
telegrams, since they enjoyed a discount rate since 1906 (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6: Press Telegrams Between Japan and Its Colonies, 1933. 
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Source: Teishinshō, Denmukyoku, Denpō kōryū jōkyō ni kansuru chōsa [Tokyo: 1935]. 
 
As part of the government effort to strengthen control over the news media, 
all of Japan’s news agencies were consolidated under the Domei News Agency 
in 1936,20 which co-existed with the three major newspapers. Japan’s news 
agencies and newspapers often maintained their own special wireless facilities 
in Japan and other parts of Asia, before the Japanese military discontinued the 
practice in August 1943. After 1943, they had to rely on the public telecommu-
nications network or Domei for sending and receiving news stories. The latter 
maintained a vast network of correspondents, offices, and wireless connections 
in Japan and throughout East Asia except Manchukuo, whose own Manchurian 
News Agency doubled as Domei branches. In 1944, Domei employees were 
present throughout the empire: in addition to nearly 3,000 employees working 
                                                             
19  Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Postwar Records E’1.2.1.2-5. Established on Novem-
ber 27, 1945, at the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Overseas Entrepreneurs Central Associa-
tion for Postwar Affairs consisted of about 150 member-institutions, but their geographical 
designations were not given. 
20  For an in-depth study of the Domei News Agency, see Roger W. Purdy, “The Ears and 
Voice of the Nation: The Domei News Agency and Japan’s News Network, 1936-1945” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1987). 
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in Japan and the formal colonies, 1,000 worked in 23 branches in China, and 
700 in over 30 branches offices in Southeast Asia.21 
Outside Japan proper, a new system was created to facilitate news-reporting 
from the field during the Pacific War. By special arrangement with the tele-
graph office, news agencies or newspaper companies could send special dis-
patches over the telegraph, to be paid by the recipient rather than by the corre-
spondent in the field. By late 1943, for instance, the Japanese-controlled 
Central China Telecommunications Co. (CCTC) had granted a total of 69 per-
mits to newspapers and news agencies to send news dispatches by telegraph 
from their branch offices in Shanghai, Nanjing, and other cities in Central 
China. Close to two thirds of them (41) were for dispatches bound for Japan, 
one third for destinations within Central China, and remaining 5 percent for 
either Manchukuo or North China. Not surprisingly, 55 (80 percent) of these 
permits were issued to three large Japanese newspapers (Asahi, Nichinichi, 
Yomiuri) or the Japanese news agency, Domei. The official news agency of the 
pro-Japanese Wang Jingwei government, China Associated Press, received 
four; nine permits were issued to foreign agencies.22 
In addition to regular news dispatches, sending photos over the telegraph 
became increasingly frequent. The first decade of regular telephotography 
service in Japan saw it limited to the trunk circuit between Tokyo and Osaka. 
Though still costly, telephotography technology improved steadily and played 
an important role in Japanese media coverage of the 1936 Berlin Olympics. 
During the 1930s, events on the Asian continent, especially the war in China, 
called for rapid expansion of telephotographic service as well as improved 
quality. Temporary service was provided for news agencies during special 
events, mostly by way of wireless. For example, during the flood in North 
China in the summer of 1939, the Japanese blockade of the British Settlement 
in Tianjin in August 1939, and the border clashes between Japanese and Soviet 
forces, the Japanese press was able to send photographs back to Japan using 
telephotography.23 The telephotography circuit between Nanjing and Tokyo, 
which used to handle an average of three messages per day, saw the daily traf-
fic sharply rising to ten in late March 1940. The Central Political Conference 
convened by Wang Jingwei and his fellow Chinese collaborators in the pro-
Japanese government in Nanjing, produced a flood of requests for telephotog-
raphy service, many of which had to be turned away due to the limited capac-
ity.24 
                                                             
21  Mainichi shinbun 70-nen shi, 321; Tsūshinsha shi hensankai, Tsūshinsha shi, 940-94. 
22  “Shinbun denpō shonin ichiran” (October 1, 1943), Huazhong Dianqi Tongxun Gongsi Bao 
457 (October 14, 1943): 631-37. 
23  See the July 1939 issues of Tōkyō Nichinichi shinbun and Tōkyō Asahi shinbun. 
24  Tōkyō Asahi shinbun, April 1, 1940. The article also noted a rising demand among the 
business to transmit letters and photos of sample products via the telephotography service. 
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The completion of the Japan-Manchukuo Trunk Cable in late 1939 greatly 
improved the prospects of telephotographic service in the imperium. In May 
1940, the Tokyo-Mukden line was extended to Beijing and Tianjin, making the 
3,000-km route the longest in the world for telephotographic transmission. 
Photographs were not the only items to be sent, however. It was also particu-
larly recommended for sending letters, tables, and graphic designs. The news-
paper Manshū Nichinichi in particular welcomed it as a “great leap” in accu-
racy for telegrams, since the message sent via telephotography did not need to 
be transcribed into codes. One MTT employee later recalled that the use of 
telephotography on the Tokyo-Mukden line was almost entirely limited to the 
military and government, since the important objective was to eliminate er-
rors.25 Judging from the traffic data during the first ten days, however, half the 
sixteen photo-telegrams sent from Osaka and Tokyo to Mukden were commer-
cial correspondence. In contrast, seven of the nine photo-telegrams sent from 
Mukden were news photographs.26 When Henry Pu Yi, the puppet emperor of 
Manchukuo, made his second visit to Japan in June 1940, the Domei News 
Agency made use of the telephotographic service linking Shinkyō (present-day 
Changchun), Keijō (present-day Seoul) and Fukuoka. The number of photo-
graphic telegrams exchanged between Manchukuo and Japan jumped fourfold 
from 157 in 1939 to 632 in 1940, with the majority (74 percent) sent from 
Japan. Despite its prohibitive cost for ordinary customers, the telephotography 
circuit had become a crucial component of the Japan-Manchukuo media net-
work.27 
Thanks to advances in wireless technology, news broadcasting via telegra-
phy became a major enterprise during the 1920s. Japan began receiving foreign 
news broadcasting in 1924 and started its own overseas news broadcasting the 
following year. Unlike the regular radio service aimed primarily at individual 
listeners, news broadcasting was designed for news agencies, Japanese and 
otherwise. With the cooperation of Domei, MOC inaugurated circular wireless 
telegraphic (dōhō musen denshin) news service in 1936, in order to better dis-
seminate processed news from Japan. Using facilities provided by the ITC, 
Japan broadcast fifteen times each day in 1937, for a total of 3,500 words. The 
majority of the broadcast was in Japanese and beamed toward China, eleven 
                                                             
25  Manshū nichinichi shinbun, October 1, 1939; Muda Hidekiyo, “Zai-Man rirekisho,” Akai 
sekiyō, 210. The Japanese newspapers had wishfully predicted that the largest photo-
telegram could contain as many as 4,200 characters, thus reducing the cost by one third as 
compared to sending the same document in a regular telegram. In reality, due to low resolu-
tion, it never was able to send characters in the same size used in the newspapers 
26  “Nichi-Man shashin denpō riyō jōkyō chōsho,” MOC Papers II-228. 
27  Dentsū tsūshin shi, 7-8. Manshū denshin denwa kabushiki kaisha 10-nen shi (1943), 955-
56. The time required for transmitting a photograph between Mukden and Tokyo, which 
could be sent in three different sizes, was about one hour. 
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times a day and a total of 2,700 words.28 After September 1941 and throughout 
the Pacific War, Domei broadcast news by wireless telegraphy toward the 
Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Each day between 8:30 a.m. to 10:00 
p.m., some 40,000 to 50,000 words of news were broadcast to all Domei of-
fices. The volume on December 8, 1941, the day Japan declared war on the 
United States and Britain, reached an all-time high of 66,000 words. By the 
beginning of 1943, a total of 53 locations throughout the world, including a few 
in Korea, Taiwan, Manchukuo, and North China, were receiving such news 
services. As one senior Domei official put it, this simultaneous news service 
was far superior to the transmission by telephone previously used by news 
agencies in Japan.29 The targeted audience was expanded to include non-
Japanese as well. Conducted in Japanese, Chinese, and English, Japan’s tele-
graphic news broadcasts amounted to over 30,000 words each day in early 
1943.30 Although “Greater East Asia” was the main target area, the news 
broadcast was also intended for Europe and the Americas. The International 
Telecommunications Company (ITC), a government-controlled facility com-
pany in Japan, devoted five 20-kW shortwave-telegraph transmitters for this 
purpose alone. In addition to the widely publicized overseas radio broadcasting, 
the Wireless Telegraphic News Service had become a major component of 
Japan’s information warfare. 
Individual Users 
At a fundamental level, the construction of Japan’s empire in Asia was made 
possible by an outward movement of the Japanese population. In addition to 
the ambitious plans for agricultural migration to Manchukuo, travel in the 
imperium can be attributed largely to administrative and business activities in 
the wake of Japan’s military occupations.31 It is estimated that by August 1945, 
some seven million Japanese were residing outside Japan proper in various 
colonies or occupied areas. Roughly half were civilians. Postwar government 
estimates may give some clue to their geographical distribution: Manchuria 
saw the largest concentration (29 percent of all Japanese outside Japan), largely 
as a result of Japan’s government-sponsored agricultural migration projects 
during the 1930s. It was followed by Korea (20 percent), China proper (14 
percent), Taiwan (14.6 percent), and Karafuto (Sakhalin) and the Kurile Islands 
(13 percent). The rest were mostly in the southern region – Southeast Asia.32 
                                                             
28  Miyamoto Yoshio, “Tsūshin jigyō to jōhō seisaku,” Teishin kyōkai zasshi, 15. 
29  Takaguchi Hisashi, “Daitōa kyōeiken to dōhō musen denshin,” Tōa denki tsūshin zasshi 3.1 
( January 1943): 21-26. 
30  Tsūshinsha shi hensankai, Tsūshinsha shi, 900-904; Kokusai denkitsūshin kabushiki kaisha 
shashi, 436-37. 
31  Kaneko Fumio, “Taigai keizai bōchō no kōzu,” 177. 
32  Jiji tsūshinsha, Jiji nenkan 1947 (Tokyo, 1947), 393. 
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Meeting the communication needs of these millions of Japanese residents 
and travellers, many with family and relatives in the home islands, was a for-
midable task. Telegrams related to a variety of personal matters therefore occu-
pied a large share of communication traffic in the imperium. As cited earlier, 
surveys conducted by MTT in 1938 and 1939 show that between 35 to 46 per-
cent of all paid telegrams sent and received in Manchukuo fell in the category 
of personal use. According to a single-day study by the MTT in November 
1939, congratulatory and condolence messages constituted 10 percent of per-
sonal telegrams; roughly another 10 percent was related to transfers of money 
and 33 percent for the purpose of announcing arrivals of passengers or ship-
ment of goods.33 
Telegraphic use was closely related to personal travel, typically for an-
nouncing arrivals or departures. A survey by the Japanese-controlled North 
China Telegraph and Telephone Co. (NCTT) in 1939, for instance, found that 
26 percent of all telegrams exchanged between Japan and North China were 
related to personal travel.34 In October 1940, NCTT surveyed a total of 14,474 
telegrams sent and received between North China and Japan (including Korea). 
Of all the outgoing telegrams, 30.7 percent were concerned with business; the 
rest dealt with personal appointments (6.8 percent), travel (25.7 percent), and 
greetings (6.8 percent), among others. Of incoming telegrams, as many as half 
of the nonbusiness telegrams dealt with personal travel.35 A similar survey of 
telegraphic traffic between North China and Manchukuo around the same time 
reveals that noncommercial telegrams (personal, travel, greetings, money, gifts) 
outstripped business telegram fourfold (4.7 times in incoming telegrams), a fact 
the author attributed to the active “exchange of personnel due to the current 
situation.”36 
In newly occupied areas such as Southeast Asia, telegrams related to per-
sonal travels were even more important, as other means of communication 
were either nonexistent or too time-consuming. A survey in July 1942 shows 
that of the 60 outgoing telegrams from Japan to Batavia in the Dutch East In-
dies over a two-day period, 43 were inquiries regarding health and safety as 
well as conveying good wishes. Ten dealt with business or commercial matters. 
The 22 incoming messages from Batavia consisted of news, commerce and 
“social telegrams.” A survey of traffic with Manila over a five-day period in 
August 1942 found similar results: Of 211 outgoing telegrams from Japan, 70 
were concerned with business, 83 with well-being and 52 with other matters. 
Of 167 incoming telegrams from the Philippines, 44 were business-related, 61 
informed the recipient of the sender’s safe arrival and 62 were concerned with 
                                                             
33  Kishimoto, “Wagasha no kokumin no kojinteki seikatsu ni taisuru kōken,” 269-71. 
34  (NCTT) Eigyō geppō 25 (August 1940), 39. 
35  “Denpō kōryū ni kansuru chōsa” (Ka-Nichi denpō), NCTT Papers, 2028/1352. 
36  Ibid. 
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expressing general well-being.37 Clearly, telecommunications greatly facilitated 
the movement of people within Japan’s imperium. 
Figure 7: Money Order Telegrams between Japan and Colonies, 1933.  
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Source: Teishinshō, Denmukyoku, Denpō kōryū jōkyō ni kansuru chōsa [Tokyo: 1935]. 
 
Telegraphic money orders played an increasingly important role for indi-
viduals as well as institutions in Japan’s imperium (see Figure 7). In addition to 
postal money orders, money order telegrams partially made up for the lack of 
regular bank transfers and became indispensable to the increased economic 
activities in North China and elsewhere. In December 1939 NCTT revived a 
prewar Chinese practice and reintroduced the service in “telegrams with mone-
tary attachments” as part of the “etiquette telegrams” (kōsai denpō). Money of 
an unlimited amount could be telegraphed for the purposes of greeting, mourn-
ing, or expressing gratitude, for a 2 percent charge. Given the inadequacy of 
financial institutions in North China during the war, this service became very 
popular and was expanded to almost all of North China by June 1940. A total 
of 47,838 such telegrams with monetary attachments were sent in 1942, 
amounting to 20 percent of all money order telegrams handled in North China. 
Among those sent within North China, telegrams with monetary attachments 
were favored by 5 to 1.38 
Telegraphic money orders were also used widely for sending money be-
tween different parts of the imperium. In 1940, for instance, money transfer 
telegrams accounted for slightly over 10 percent of all telegrams exchanged 
                                                             
37  “Batabiya musen sōshin naiyōbetsu chōsho”; “Batabiya musen raishin naiyōbetsu chōsho”; 
“Manila musen sōshin naiyōbetsu chōsho”; “Manila musen raishin naiyōbetsu chōsho”; all 
in MOC I-297. 
38  Kahoku denden jigyō shi, 140-42. The prewar Chinese service of “telegram with flowers,” 
however, was not revived, due to lack of demand. 
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between North China and Japan (including Korea). Interestingly, some 65.5 
percent of the incoming ones (93.5 percent of the total amount) came to North 
China from Korea, reflecting increasing economic ties between the two regions 
within the imperium.39 In 1943, a total of 345,935 money order telegrams were 
sent to Japan from North China, as compared to 14,345 sent within North 
China and 17,662 from North China to Manchukuo.40 The extremely high 
volume of money order telegrams sent from China to Japan (including Korea) 
shows that it has become an important channel of monetary flow between Ja-
pan and occupied areas. 
Japanese vs. Non-Japanese Users 
As can be expected in a colonial setting, the unequal power relations affected 
the use of telecommunications. Imperial Japan’s communication data collectors 
often paid close attention to which categories the individual users belonged to. 
Data on telegraph use in Manchukuo and occupied China shows a clear dispar-
ity along ethnic lines among those who used the service. According to one 
survey, 67 percent of all telegrams handled by the MTT in the mid-1930s were 
sent by Japanese. The Chinese, who made up more than 90 percent of the popu-
lation, sent only 13 percent of all telegrams. Of the telegrams exchanged be-
tween Manchukuo and China proper, the Chinese only sent 23 percent, com-
pared with 67 percent sent by Japanese.41 A one-day survey in Manchukuo in 
1939 showed that over 80 percent of private-use telegrams were sent by Japa-
nese, with Chinese and Koreans making up the remaining 20 percent.42 
Compared with Manchukuo, the Chinese use of telegraphic service in North 
China was considerably higher. A three-day survey conducted by NCTT in 
1940, for instance, showed that 41.6 percent of telegrams sent and 43 percent 
of telegrams received in North China were in Chinese. On certain routes, Chi-
nese-language telegrams even surpassed those in Japanese. For instance, Chi-
nese-language telegrams exchanged with Central China made up 55.8 percent 
(outgoing) and 60 percent (incoming) of the totals.43 But Japanese dominated 
the external traffic in occupied China as a whole. In October 1940, the NCTT 
surveyed 14,474 telegrams sent and received between North China and Japan 
                                                             
39  “Denpō kōryō ni kansuru chōsa” (Ka-Nichi denpō), NCTT Papers, 2028/1352. 
40  “Shōwa 18-nen kawase denpō hasshin jōkyō chōsho,” [NCTT] Eigyō geppō 68 ( January 
1944), 15. 
41  Maeda Naozō, “Manshū ni okeru denshin denwa jigyō no keiei,” Teishin Kyōkai Zasshi 330 
(February 1936): 151-61; Manshū denshin denwa kabushiki kaisha, Manshū denshin denwa 
kabushiki kaisha 10-nen shi, 951-52. 
42  Kishimoto Hajime, “Wagasha no kokumin no kojinteki seikatsu ni,” 270-71. In the largest 
category of “miscellaneous telegrams” that included announcing arrivals and sending 
money, close to 30 percent were sent by Koreans and Chinese. 
43 NCTT, Eigyōbu, Eigyōka, Eigyō chōsa kakari, “Denpō kōryū ni kansuru chōsa” (1. Nai-
koku denpō) (May 1940), NCTT Papers 2028/1352. 
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(including Korea). All but 2 percent were in Japanese.44 According to a survey 
conducted in Central China by the CCTC in mid-1939, nearly 60 percent of all 
telegrams sent and received in that region were in Japanese. Chinese-language 
telegrams made up only one quarter of the total traffic; only in telegrams sent 
to and from North China were Chinese-language telegrams a majority.45 
In telephone use a great disparity also existed between the Japanese and 
non-Japanese population. In Beijing alone, as one 1943 NCTT study acknowl-
edged, some 110,000 Japanese residents accounted for 86 percent of all tele-
phone usage; the approximately two million Chinese accounted for the remain-
ing 14 percent. Only in long-distance phone use was the gap less glaring, 
although the Japanese still accounted for 58 percent of all usage. NCTT justi-
fied this disparity by “the fact that most Japanese are extremely involved in 
active production.” It noted that the Chinese in fact tended to use the telephone 
more than the telegraph because of the latter’s cumbersome nature. Moreover, 
the study pointed to the relatively widespread use of telephone in some parts of 
North China, especially in the East Hebei area, which alone accounted for 26 
percent of all telephone usage in the region.46 
It is true that throughout the imperium, Japanese access to and use of tele-
communications service was disproportionately high. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to note that even in its formal empire, the Japanese were far from the only 
ones making use of the modern communications facilities. Many colonial sub-
jects had access to telecommunications either in the formal empire or in newly 
occupied areas in China or Southeast Asia. Indeed, it often served Japanese 
purposes for the non-Japanese population in the imperium to make use of Japa-
nese-controlled telecommunications service as individual customers (as op-
posed to institutional ones). The NCTT revival of the “telegrams with monetary 
attachments,” which seemed to be mostly used by the Chinese, was a case in 
point. Such measures not only helped expand the revenue base of Japan’s tele-
communications operations but also enabled the Japanese to demonstrate their 
superior technology and management to the local population they sought to 
control. That the first and foremost objective of Japan’s imperial telecommuni-
cations network was to serve Japanese needs was never in doubt, as was the 
necessity to retain control over all important telecommunications operations in 
Japanese hands. After all, as communication scholar M.J. Mulgan puts it, the 
                                                             
44  NCTT, Eigyōbu, Eigyōka, Eigyō chōsa kakari, “Denpō kōryū ni kansuru chōsa” (Nikka) 
(May 1941), NCTT Papers 2028/1352. Strictly speaking, of course, some Chinese might 
have sent telegrams in Japanese due to better rates. 
45  Kōain, Kachō renrakubu, Chū-Shi ni okeru denpō kōryū jōkyō, denwa tsūwa jōkyō chōsa 
setsumei shiryō (November 1939), esp. 1-3. 
46  “Denki tsūshin no riyō,” (NCTT) Kenkyū zasshi 3.1 (1943), 110. 
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“distribution of control capacities” in an information society is even more 
important than the access to information as such.47 
Directionality of Information Flow 
Contrary to common expectations, information flow was not always even in 
both directions. Such an imbalance was not accidental, but due to structural 
causes. In a pioneering effort to understand the structural aspects of imperial-
ism, Johan Galtung suggested that a “feudal interaction structure between cen-
ter and periphery” largely holds true for most world communication and trans-
portation patterns. As evidence, he argued that “Center news takes up a much 
larger proportion of Periphery news media” and that “the Periphery produces 
events that the Center turns into news.”48 The traffic data on news telegrams in 
Japan’s imperium seem to bear this out. The 1933 national survey cited above 
demonstrated an incoming volume of press telegrams from Japan’s colonies 
smaller than the outgoing ones from Japan, although the traffic from the Kwan-
tung Territory (channeling news from Manchuria) was relatively high (see 
Figure 6) An analysis of press telegrams traffic within Japan’s East Asian sys-
tem shows that the volume of outgoing press telegrams outstripped incoming 
telegrams by almost 4 to 1, a trend even more pronounced in the category of 
“urgent telegrams” (more than 5 to 1).49 The large outflow of news stories from 
Japan seems to reflect the cultural and political dependency of the periphery on 
the metropole. 
Directionality was also evident in money transfer telegrams in the imperium, 
albeit for a different reason. The direction of their net flow, as seen in Figure 5, 
was the opposite to that of press telegrams between Japan and its colonies 
during the prewar period. In all of Japan’s five colonies and administered areas, 
the number of outgoing money orders to Japan outstripped incoming ones by a 
significant margin. This can be a bit misleading, however. According to a sur-
vey in North China in late 1940, although the volume of outgoing telegrams 
from North China to Japan (including Korea) was 4.7 times that of the incom-
ing ones, their average amount was much smaller (149 yen) than the latter (489 
yen). Even more interesting is the fact that the overwhelming majority (65.5 
percent of telegram volumes, but 93.5 percent of total amount) of the incoming 
                                                             
47  M.J. Mulgan, Communication and Control (Cambridge, Mass.: The Polity Press, 1991), 12. 
Even if as a whole they were still at a disadvantage compared with the Japanese, many 
Taiwanese and Koreans with telephone subscriptions were more privileged than the major-
ity of Japanese at a time when telephones were still luxury items in Japan. 
48  Johan Galtung, “Structure of Imperialism,” Journal of Peace Research 8.2 (1971), 93. 
49  Among Japan’s remaining communications with the few foreign countries, the number of 
incoming press telegrams was about twice as many as the outgoing ones in 1943, although 
the number of words was about the same; see Denmu nenkan, 1943 (Tokyo, 1943), 269, 
270. 
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money transfers to North China were from colonial Korea. The NCTT ex-
plained that the Japanese businessmen typically worked for large companies 
and thus used banks instead of telegrams to send money to North China, 
whereas Korean businessmen, with smaller capital and more scattered in North 
China, found money order telegrams more convenient.50 In contrast, the outgo-
ing ones were individuals transferring part of their income to family members 
in Japan. Kumamoto, Hiroshima, and Osaka topped the destinations of these 
money transfer telegrams from North China. This has to do with the fact that 
Japanese working in the new empire outside the metropole often had greater 
opportunities for promotion and typically received a variety of bonuses and 
subsidies. Japanese who worked at MTT, for instance, on average, were paid 
three times the amount of their base salary.51 For instance, when the 30-year 
old Mutō Tomio left Japan to become a ranking official in Manchukuo’s Jus-
tice Ministry, he was said to be making the same salary as a Higher Court Jus-
tice at home.52 
Quantifying Integration? 
Social scientists have used different methods to quantify integration. As meas-
urements of integration, economic historians have long studied trade and finan-
cial movements. In a pathbreaking work on the relationship between communi-
cation and the economy published in the late 1950s, Nishibayashi Tadatoshi of 
the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTTPC, a successor 
to the Ministry of Communications) was among the first to emphasize the 
linkage between communication traffic patterns and economic spheres. Tradi-
tionally, Nishibayashi noted, an economic sphere had been defined by the 
movement of people, the exchange of goods, and the flow of money. As a 
result, the intensity and strength of the sphere were determined by the condi-
tions of such factors. As “communication plays a leading role in the formation 
of modern economic spheres,” Nishibayashi argued, “the economic activity of 
an economic sphere can most straightforwardly be assessed by the conditions 
of communication exchange.”53 The conclusion of his study of telecommunica-
tions traffic data in postwar Japan may be obvious: economic spheres defined 
in terms of demographics and goods tend to form in adjacent areas, whereas 
economic spheres based on communications are not affected by distance. Po-
litical scientists, on the other hand, speak of general “transactions” in studying 
                                                             
50  “Denpō ni kansuru chōsa” (Ka-Nichi denpō), 4, NCTT Papers, 2028/1352. The total value 
of outgoing money transfers to Japan was 1.5 times of incoming ones. 
51  DDJS, 6: 385. Chinese employees received a bonus of between 5 and 70 percent. 
52  Mutō Tomio, Watashi to Manshūkoku (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1988), 16-17. 
53  Nishibayashi Tadatoshi, Tsūshin to keizai (Tokyo: Keibunkan, 1957), 123-43. However, 
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integrative processes. In the 1960s the political scientist Karl W. Deutsch and 
his colleagues suggested that integration is a quantifiable concept and focused 
specifically on “transborder data flow,” but they were never able to devise me-
trics that would permit accurate assessment. In recent years, the scholarly 
community has grown less sanguine about such a strictly quantitative ap-
proach.54 
Within each area in Japanese-occupied China, Japan’s dominance of tele-
communications was reflected in the new patterns of communication traffic. 
Significantly, in 1939 Central China exchanged more telegrams with Japan – 
roughly 37 percent of the total number of telegram traffic – than with neighbor-
ing North China (28 percent) or within Central China (25 percent).55 Areas 
serviced by the NCTT also showed stronger telegram volume within the region 
in 1939, which roughly equaled those exchanged with Japan and Manchukuo, 
but as in Central China over 70 percent of all telegrams were in Japanese.56 A 
survey in March 1942 showed telegraphic traffic again increased across the 
board in all areas of North China compared to previous year. Interestingly, 
traffic with Korea enjoyed the highest rate of growth (48.7 percent) followed 
by communication with Japan (31.2 percent), Central China (27.7 percent), 
Inner Mongolia (24.3 percent), and Manchukuo (17.2 percent). In absolute 
numbers, however, traffic with Japan now dominated, outstripping North 
China’s traffic with other areas combined. Telephone traffic in North China 
over the same period demonstrated a slightly different pattern: monthly traffic 
with Japan increased some 142 percent over a year earlier thanks to improved 
connections as well as demand, whereas the volume within North China in-
creased only 24 percent, with Manchukuo 9 percent, and Inner Mongolia 12 
percent. Telephone traffic with Central China declined by 20 percent.57 In 
relative terms, then, Japan strengthened communications ties with different 
regions in China at the expense of ties between these regions. 
A similar pattern can be observed in colonial Taiwan’s telegraphic traffic 
over a longer time span. During the entire colonial period between 1895 and 
1945, the volume of Taiwan-Japan traffic increased at a greater pace than the 
intra-island traffic. Whereas in 1897 there were three Taiwan-Japan telegrams 
for every seven intra-island telegrams, by 1907 the ratio had been reduced to 4 
to 6. By 1940, the ratio had reversed to six telegrams exchanged between Tai-
                                                             
54  For a discussion of problems involved in measuring integration, see Donald J. Puchala, 
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56  “Minkoku 28-nen johanki denpō tsūsu oyobi ryōkin chōsho” ( July 1, 1939): 26-27, NCTT 
Papers, 2028/824. 
57  Denmu nenkan 1943, 208-9. 
 87
wan and Japan for every four telegrams sent within Taiwan. This was largely 
due to the improved connections between Japan and its colony, but it also re-
flected Taiwan’s growing importance as a springboard for Japan’s southward 
expansion. After the outbreak of the war in China in 1937, Taiwan’s role in 
South China also became increasingly prominent. Telegrams with South China 
– many of which were relayed to and from Japan – generated 41 percent of all 
Taiwan’s telegraphic income in 1940.58 
Transborder communications traffic can serve as rough indicators of the de-
gree of dominance and relative intensity of ties. Although any analysis of the 
information flow can at best give a rough measure of the structural dynamics 
rather than serve as precise barometers of integration, it is clear that when 
Japan launched the war in the Pacific in December 1941, it had reordered 
Northeast Asian space enough to have become the de facto center of power in 
the realm of information flow via telecommunications. In other words, as far as 
information flow was concerned, the core area of Japan’s new imperium had 
already taken some semblance of imperial integration. Needless to say, quanti-
tative data alone cannot satisfactorily answer the question of integration. How 
communication may contribute to integration is ultimately a qualitative ques-
tion as well. 
 
* * * 
 
Studying telecommunications traffic not only offers a new window to examine 
daily life in the Japanese empire but also helps shed light on its structure and 
internal dynamics. 
This preliminary analysis of available Japanese telecommunications traffic 
data provides further evidence that empire-building is a multifaceted endeavor 
and involves much more than just military conquest. In an imperium created by 
force, Japanese power certainly depended heavily on a comprehensive military 
command and control network; equally if not more important was the flow of 
information that made all organized activities possible. Ultimately, sustaining 
the imperial project and binding the imperium together was made possible by 
the movement of people, goods, money, as well as information. In that sense, 
imperial communication served as an indispensable lubricant for the imperium. 
Although frequently stymied by bureaucratic rivalry, Japan’s extensive tele-
communications network at home and in Asia made possible an unprecedented 
degree of administrative centralization and imperial market integration. In the 
final analysis, Japan’s imperial telecommunications network made the Japanese 
wartime empire more than simply an imagined community, even though the 
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role of telecommunications for Japan’s imperial integration was as much imag-
ined as it was real. 
Needless to say, this chapter has only scratched the surface of a potentially 
vast subject. More work remains to be done. For one, by measuring informa-
tion flow between cities and regions within the Japanese imperium, it is possi-
ble to establish a more precise information hierarchy as well as its changes over 
time than presented here. Moreover, a comparison between the Japanese em-
pire and other modern empires from the perspective of information flow will 
highlight the similarities and differences in their structural dynamics.  
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